Many say that metaphysics is, for all effective purposes, a battleground of abandoned theories. Most of these theories seem to have originated in intuitive imagination of thoerists, heavily soaked in conceptual analysis. In the war of ontologies, not many have come out alive. Perhaps, the weapons were not adequate for the rich density of our world? Perhaps, intuition and conceptual analysis alone cannot latch onto reality sufficiently.
In the past decade, substantial critiques of analytic metaphysics have emerged, focusing on the deficiencies of intuition and conceptual analysis. An alternate route to track our world has taken the shape of scientific metaphysics, which derives metaphysical claims through tight corroboration with scientific theories. Can the weapons of scientific metaphysics join intuition and conceptual analysis to read the metaphysics of our world?
The workings of scientific metaphysics form a critical part of my research. As a metaphysician of science, I intend to evaluate scientific metaphysics from a critical rationalist perspective.
Another line of inquiry which greatly excites me is the role of theoretical virtues in vetting metaphysical theories. Can the protocol of theory choice applicable to scientific theories be transferred to choosing between metaphysical theories? What form do theoretical virtues take in metaphysics? These are some of the questions which dominate my research. I am also exploring the role of ideological parsimony in scientific metaphysics, to reveal the ways in which our tendency to speculate and develop claims over and beyond those warranted by the available empirical evidence can quietly sneak into our metaphysical theories.